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The article analyses the latest reforms in active and passive labour market policies 
(LMPs) in Germany, Italy and Denmark, within a European perspective. These Member 
States employ three of the various kinds of social security systems found in the EU - 
Continental, Mediterranean and Nordic - and provide an interesting example for 
comparison of differences/common trends in LMPs. This contribution focuses 
particularly on the principal characteristics of each protection system in the event of 
unemployment and on the relationships between unemployment benefits and activation 
policies and highlights the links between the European Employment Guidelines and the 
regulation under analysis.  
 





1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In order to address the challenges faced by European trends in labour markets (LMs) in 
the new century, and as a way of facing the current economic crisis, Member States 
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have adopted reforms that move towards the EU notion of flexicurity, already 
considered to be a crucial component of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
A key aspect of the strategy is the significant role envisaged for active and passive 
labour market policies (LMPs). These policies are constantly promoted within the 
European Employment Strategy’s (EES) recommendations, in accordance with specific 
EU concepts which Member States should consider, such as the modernisation of social 
security systems, the fostering of active inclusion, the need to strengthen active LMPs 
by increasing their effectiveness, targeting, outreach activities, coverage, linkage with 
passive measures, accompanied by rights and responsibilities, etc. At the same time, EU 
employment policies have been reflected very differently in the domestic systems, due 
to variety in the Member States in terms of security for the unemployed, the efficiency 
of initiatives adopted, cultural difference, the legal framework in place, etc. 
The article aims to analyse the latest reforms in active and passive LMPs in three 
Member States - Germany, Italy and Denmark - within a European perspective. The 
article will also highlight the links between the European Employment Guidelines 
(EUEG)
1
 relating to active and passive LMPs and the regulation under analysis.  
These Member States employ three of the various kinds of social security systems 
found in the EU - Continental, Mediterranean and Nordic - and provide an interesting 
example for comparison of differences and common trends in LMPs. These systems are 
also characterised by significant recent reforms and specific outstanding issues in the 
field under analysis. 
The article will focus particularly on the principal characteristics of each protection 
system in the event of unemployment, and the relationships between unemployment 
benefits and activation policies. This will be addressed in detail in the section 
concerning the activation duties of beneficiaries in the case of unemployment.  
 
1.1.  METHODOLOGY REMARKS 
 
The analysis of the systems chosen, in accordance with the goals of this article, focuses 
on a number of recent passive and active LMP reforms that can be considered useful in 
helping us understand developments and tendencies in the field. Since space is limited, 
only those elements deemed most valuable for our research objectives will be analysed. 
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Furthermore, when referring to passive and active LMPs, only those relating to 
unemployment are discussed. 
In particular, we will consider how reforms affect the eligibility requirements, duration, 
and financial level of unemployment benefits; how they impact on activation systems, 
such as administration and management and the outsourcing of public services to 
private actors; and in particular we will look at the increased burden of activation duties 
on the person, together with an increase in the contractualisation of unemployment 
benefits. In this context, contractualisation is the connection between activation duties 
and social benefits as a quid pro quo of a contractual relationship between public 
administration and citizen, as adopted in the New Public Management (NPM) approach. 
This approach, or better, this policy, was launched in the UK by the Thatcher 
government in the 1980s, in an attempt at modernising the public sector
2
 within the neo-
liberal perspective
3
 and it heavily influenced the systems of other Member States, 
including all three of those under analysis here. 
Where any links between recent reforms and the EUEG are mentioned, the article has 
taken into consideration the EUEG, the National Action Plans (NAPs) of the Member 
States under analysis, the National Reform Programmes (after 2005, NRPs) and any 
Country-specific Recommendations that may have preceded the changes in domestic 
policy.   
In particular, the article will highlight when regulations refer to those concepts included 
in the EUEG or in Country-specific Recommendations, when considered valuable for 
the research goals of the article, and when domestic reforms are announced in the 
NAPs/NRPs to comply with the EUEG or the specific Recommendations.  
It is difficult and complicated to determine when EUEG has influenced domestic 
regulation and when it has not. The process could be akin to that highlighted by 
Bercusson in the delineation of EU labour law and its interaction with national labour 
laws;
4
 any influence would be mutual and part of a process conditioned by different and 
multifaceted variables. This article, however, does not analyse this aspect.  
Besides, on the one hand recommendations for the implementation of EUEG are not 
legally, but rather politically binding, affecting the systems of the Member States in 
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different ways. On the other hand, ‘soft-law mechanisms in the area of socio-economic 
policies may not appear so soft after all’,
5
 especially since the start of the economic 
crisis and the implementation of the European Semester. 
By analysing the recent domestic reforms in the LMs of the Member States under 
consideration, this article intends to contribute to the development of a wider picture of 
the connections between national reforms and the EU dimension.  
 
 
2. THE DANISH SYSTEM  
 
2.2.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between Danish passive and active LMPs is conditioned by specific 
features of this system, such as the Scandinavian LM culture and the principles on 
which the welfare system is based which affect the conceptualisation of ‘workfare’ and 
the approach in activation. The particular LM culture
6
 focuses on the collective 
dimension of society and on trust among people. Within this context, social partners 
play a pivotal role in the representation of collective interests,
7
 and the balance between 
this and macroeconomic policy, heavily supported by public investment, and 
international economic trends, has been and is still crucial.
8
 The connection between 
activation duties and unemployment benefits/subsidies is an example of ‘workfare’, or 
welfare to work, i.e. benefits/subsidies should support people entering or re-entering the 
job market. 
Indeed, Danish workfare can be defined as an ‘offensive’ measure since the aim is 
‘social integration through active labour market policies’, and not ‘defensive’, such as 
the work-first American workfare model.
9
 In accordance with the idea of ‘offensive 
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workfare’, activation measures are considered tools for social integration because they 
empower the individual (human capital approach).
10
 Within this perspective, 
unemployment benefits are not a mere quid pro quo to specific duties.
11
  At the same 
time, the conditionality between unemployment benefits and activation duties is a 
crucial aspect of the Danish system; this conditionality is regulated by law, and 
activation initiatives are individually tailor-made in an agreement between the 
unemployed and the job centres. This agreement would be a ‘contract’ under the New 
Public Management perspective (NPM). Thus, the mentioned ‘contract’ is included in 
the idea of contractualisation of social rights,
12
 as a key concept of the NPM. But 
Danish scholars do not agree that this conditionality is a contractualisation, asserting 
that no genuine contractual relationship occurs between the unemployed and the PES 
(or job centre). 
The concept of conditionality in Denmark is based on the self-reliance principle and 
self-support of each able-bodied individual: each person should, when possible, be 
active and participate in the social life by working or by attending activation 
initiatives.
13
 The Danish Constitution states both the ‘right to work’ - which implies 
efforts to be made to guarantee work - and the right to receive public assistance for ‘any 
person unable to support himself or his dependants’. At the same time, the beneficiary 
of public assistance ‘shall comply with the obligations imposed by statue in such 
respect’.
14
 Sanctions are entailed in the case of non-compliance with activation 
proposals from the PES.  
As is known, the Danish system was taken as a best practice example to look at in the 
formulation of the EU common principles of flexicurity (Com 2007) 359 final). Danish 
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flexicurity is characterised by high flexibility and high mobility in the LM by providing 
a reasonably easy way to hire and fire people, together with internal flexibility, such as 
in working arrangements, company organisation, etc. The social impact of this 
flexibility is mitigated by a strong welfare system and effective activation policies 
addressed to the unemployed: these elements make up the so-called ‘Danish triangle’.
15
 
Furthermore, the Danish model has always focused on the goal of full employment, and 
thus appears to be in line with the EU idea of building a knowledge society, aimed at 
‘full employment and social progress’ (Art. 3 TEU, ex Art. 2 TEC). 
With regards to benefits in the case of unemployment Denmark ensures two levels of 
protection: (i) social assistance for specific social events (e.g. unemployment), i.e. 
public means-tested cash-benefits, accessible under particular circumstances when the 
person is temporarily not able to meet his/her needs or those of his/her family (no 
temporal limits are fixed; the amount depends on different aspects, e.g. children, etc.; an 
income-related housing benefit system can be also provided); (ii) unemployment 
insurance benefits (up to a maximum of 90% wage, maximum rate of EUR 562 per 
week, maximum 2 years), based on voluntary membership in private funds, which are 
run by trade unions.
16
 Eligibility requirements for the insurance unemployment benefits 
are: at least one year’s membership of the insurance fund; one year worked in the last 
two years; unemployment status, also linked to the availability to work, and the will to  
accept suitable job offers, or take part in activation measures (requested also in case of 
social assistance). This availability implies different duties, such as periodical 
interviews by the PES, and regular access to the Jobnet website, etc. 
 
2.3. DANISH REFORMS IN LMPS AND THE EUEG 
 
In the last 15 years there have been three main phases that should be highlighted in the 
development of Danish LMP: 
 
2.3.1. More people in employment, 2002-2003 
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The 2002 NAP announced the commitment to present an Action Plan to promote ‘more 
people in employment’, in order to ‘ensure the quickest way into employment’. This 
was a reply to the specific Council Recommendation, mentioned in the NAP, aiming at 
encouraging more people to participate in the LM. Coherence between ensuring the 
quickest way into employment and achieving the goal to promote more people to work 
was taken for granted. Thus, the 2002/2003 ‘More People at Work’ reform (Flere i 
arbejde) focused on a ‘work-first’ approach, by stressing the priority to place the 
unemployed in new jobs, providing them with contacts and talks and highlighting the 
relevance of job matching.  
At the same time, the reform provoked a decrease in the provision of educational 
schemes, reduced by 50 per cent.
17
 On the one hand, the reform seemed to be coherent 
with the EUEG goal of ‘a more employment-friendly approach’ in which benefits and 
training systems (and also tax) had to be reviewed to ensure effective integration of the 
unemployed into the LM. On the other hand, the reduction in training and education 
was not requested by the EUEG and is unlikely to be of value in achieving those more 
and ‘better’ jobs, demanded by the 2000 Lisbon Agenda. The cut in training and 
education may have been encouraged by the reform, according to which municipalities 
receive a rate of reimbursement that is fixed ‘with consideration to substitutable 
allowances and promotion of active measures in order to reduce passive support’, as 
highlighted by 2003 NAP. Thus, municipalities receive incentives to integrate workers 
more quickly into any job rather than taking the time to train them, in a human capital 
approach, which would be more focused on the quality of training and job offers. 
The reform introduced a more bureaucratic approach in activation, with the aim of 
improving monitoring and matching activities. These goals were highlighted by the 
2001 EUEG, whereas since 2000 focus had been on the development of additional 
indicators specifying national objectives and targets, and improvements in data 
collection (2000 EUEG). Even if benchmarking aimed to create transparency and 
contribute to cost-effectiveness through comparison of costs, the bureaucratic approach, 
which was fostered by the reform, focused on standardisation and consequently 
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weakened the relevance of people’s preferences in the search for work or vocational 
training opportunities.
18
   
 
2.3.2. Strukturreformen, 2007 
 
The 2005 Danish NRP announced the plan to modify the distribution of responsibilities 
in public administration. This plan was implemented in the administrative reform of 1 
January 2007 (2007 Reform, Strukturreformen, or Structural Reform), which modified 
the administrative organisation of LMP in Denmark. The goal was to modernise the 
public sector to make it more efficient, in accordance with the EU Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines aiming at promoting an ‘efficient allocation of resources’.
19
 
This reform had been under discussion for years: on the one hand, some authors 
believed that the reform would help improve the efficiency of public services and save 
money by designing a more efficient organisation.
20
 On the other hand, some other 
authors believed that it weakened regional corporatism and the role of the social 
partners, since the pivotal tasks of LMPs were transferred from the social partners to the 
municipalities.
21
 This aspect could be considered incoherent with several EU indications 
to involve social partners in the implementation of EUEG. 
The reform created one-stop-shop ‘job centres’ managed by the municipalities that 
absorbed both the Public Employment Services (PES) and the local authority-led 
service centres. Their goal was to provide all citizens with employment services, 
without distinguishing between unemployed people receiving insurance benefits and 
those receiving social assistance.
22
   
The reform also introduced new tools for the collection of data and performance 
measurement. 
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In this regard it is interesting to highlight Jørgensen, Baadsgaard and Nørup’s position 
on those tools; they believe they have been introduced and used without explaining how 
the information should be considered and what criteria should be used to determine 
priorities. No political discussion took place and public values such as justice, equality 
and accessibility were not taken into account. These observations are interesting 
because they raise the issue of how databases should be used, and how to define 
efficiency in PESs. 
Besides the implementation of the Structural reform which came into force on 1 January 
2007, the 2005 NRP announced – as a challenge for the following year – ‘the extension 
of citizens’ free choice of provider of welfare services’. Consequently, after the 2007 
reform, the outsourcing of employment services rapidly expanded and the role of social 
partners was reduced to an advisory one in projects led by ‘other actors’ in LMP. These 
‘other actors’, which are mostly private firms, have become an alternative to the LMP 




2.3.3. Spring Package 2008 and increase in contractualisation in 2009 
 
In March 2009 Denmark implemented the so-called ‘Spring Package’ (Forårspakke 
2.00) which established public investments to create new jobs, (additional public 
investments were stated for the period 2010-2013) and more efficient employment 
services, such as vocational training, with more possibilities to choose the training 
initiatives in which to participate.  
In 2008 the unemployed were asked to meet stricter activation obligations; both 
categories of unemployed - beneficiaries of unemployment insurance benefits and 
beneficiaries of means-tested cash-benefits - must register with a job centre and accept 
any ‘suitable’ job offers and active LM programmes proposed by the municipalities.
24
 
This tendency towards increasing contractualisation has steadily evolved, in the opinion 
of Anderson, into ‘meaningless activation’,
 25
 i.e. activation focused on duties and on a 
mere work first approach towards ‘any job’ (no longer a human capital approach), 
within a punitive perspective.  
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But if we look at the specific Council Recommendations addressed to Denmark, no 
specific pressure towards a work first approach had been applied by the EU.  The 2005 
political agreement ‘A new chance for everyone’ reinforced the rules on availability for 
recipients of social assistance, in accordance with the 2005 EUEG ‘make work pay for 
job-seekers, including disadvantaged people and the inactive’.
26
 A punitive approach 
was adopted in Denmark also in the case of assistance from 2010 onwards. The person 
can however legitimately refuse the job offer in case of justified reasons, only partly 
listed by the law. 
 
2.3.4. From 2010 to now 
 
In May 2010, the year after the announcement of long-term public investments in 
Denmark, the European Commission highlighted the need to limit the Danish public 
debt.
27
 As a response, the government decided to cut tax and implement measures to 
increase private consumption.  
Together with an increase in activation obligations, downsizing of the unemployment 
benefits system also involved reducing the length of unemployment benefit provision, 
from 4 years to 2 years from 2012, and a tightening of the eligibility requirements.
28
 
This could be viewed as being in line with one version of the ‘modernisation’ of social 
security systems, promoted by the EUEG: a downsizing of public expenditures 
allocated to this field and a tighter link between unemployment benefits and activation 
duties. The definition and entity of the ‘modernisation’ required to achieve ‘a smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth’ (Europe 2020) is not known. 
Four policy reforms have been introduced since 2012, all aimed at facilitating entry into 
new jobs. The first was the 2012 Reform of the Disability Pension and Flexi-job 
Scheme
29
 (Disability and Flex reform) which focused on strengthening job skills and 
social integration for particular categories of people:
30
 this reform answered in 
particular to the 2011 Council Recommendation addressed to Denmark,
31
 mentioning 
expressly Flexi-job; and in part to Council Recommendations in previous years, which 
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28 
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30  
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31 
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recommended improving the protection for people at the margins of the LM, such as 
immigrants, but also disabled persons.  Since 1/1/2003 a new form of Flexi-job has been 
introduced for people with severe disabilities, the employment rate of which in 
Denmark is below the EU average.
32
 This new Flexi-job however does not recognise, in 
contrast to the ‘old’ form, a salary equal to that of a person employed under usual 
working conditions. Besides the risk of pay discrimination, research has shown the 
potential negative impact this form of assistance may have on the health of the 
beneficiary,
33
 therefore raising doubts over its consistency with the EU’s social 
inclusion goal. 
The other three reforms were the 2013 Cash Benefit Reform which aims at providing 
training opportunities and job offers; the 2014 Reform of the Sickness Benefit Scheme, 
which has the goal of returning the person on sick leave to the LM as quickly as 
possible; and the 2014 Employment Reform, which focused on the idea of an 
individually tailored effort to ensure rapid placement in employment. A new agency 
was formed in Denmark on 1 January 2014; the Danish Agency for Labour Market and 
Recruitment’s task is to retain people in the LM, and it focuses on the transition from 
unemployment and social security benefits into education and employment.  
In 2014 the European Commission assessed that Denmark had reduced its economic 
deficit to a sustainable level
34
 and the Council recommended the continued pursuit of 
the ‘growth-friendly fiscal policy’, the adoption of further measures to improve 
employability of people at risk of labour market marginalisation and to foster 
competition in the domestic service sector,
35
 whereas both the 2015 and 2016 
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Active and passive LMPs in Italy have traditionally been characterised by problems, 
regarding both activation obligations and unemployment benefits. With regard to 
passive LMP, Italy has tried for years to introduce reforms to harmonise a considerable 
number of different types of unemployment benefit and short-term assistance, which 
were - and in some measure still are - different from each other, and offer more 
protection in traditionally stronger employment sectors.  
Another crucial pending issue is the lack of means-tested benefits to support 
unemployed persons who do not reach the contributory requirements for insurance 
benefits, such as is often the case with atypical workers. Although new benefits have 
recently been introduced, as will be mentioned later in the text, these benefits cannot be 
considered as the achievement of a level of universal assistance protection. 
At local level, public administrations can decide to offer support to unemployed people 
who do not have access to insurance benefits; there is considerable variation in how this 
is managed between municipalities and between North and South Italy (usually 
configured as means-tested benefits).   
Regarding activation, one of the main problems faced is the inefficiency of public 
employment offices, together with the non-homogeneity of services at national level, 
with considerable regional and municipal differences.
37
  
The relationship between unemployment benefits and activation duties in Italy can be 
based on the link between two constitutional rights:  the right (and duty) to work 
(Article 4 of the Italian Constitution) and the right to protection in the case of 
unemployment (Article 38).
38
 Taking it from there, according to Cinelli, protection in 
the case of unemployment should be intended in two ways: (i) protection against 
unemployment, by providing citizens with public employment services and vocational 
training to enable them to be active (active LMP); and (ii) protection in the case of 
unemployment, by providing citizens with unemployment benefits to cope with the 
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temporary lack of work.
39
 It is also relevant here to point out that this constitutional 
interpretation has been dealing, in the last 15 years, with attempts to base the provision 
of unemployment benefits on a declaration or agreement to comply with activation 




3.2. ITALIAN REFORMS IN LMPS AND EUEG 
 
In the following pages we will analyse the two main reforms of recent years which 
aimed at reaching flexicurity in accordance with EU indications. 
 
3.2.1. The Monti-Fornero reform, 2012 
 
If we look at the Country-specific Recommendations for Italy, especially of 2011 and 
2012,
41
 the flexibility of the LM is mentioned as a crucial issue to be addressed. As a 
matter of fact, the EU indications insisted on structural reforms in this direction.
42
  
The reforms of recent years introduced considerable flexibility through deregulation, 
but flexible arrangements could also have been reached through collective bargaining, 
without legislative intervention. Instead, the role of the social partners has been 
downsized in the last 10 years (especially under the Berlusconi Governments), contrary 
to EU indications, which maintain crucial the role of social partners in the 
implementation of European Employment policies. 
The Monti-Fornero reform, which was adopted through Law n. 92/2012, downsized the 
level of protection in the case of collective dismissal and modified a number of labour 
contracts. These new rules aim to answer the 2011 County-specific Recommendations 
to ‘reinforce measures to combat segmentation in the labour market, also by reviewing 
selected aspects of employment protection legislation including dismissal rules’, to 
which the 2012 NAP referred.  The NAP also stressed the need to extend the access to 
unemployment benefits. Indeed, together with the need for flexibility, the EU 
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Institutions stressed the need for protection in the LM, which should have been 
particularly relevant in a country such as Italy, with low standards of social security 
protection compared to those of other MS, such as Denmark.  
The Monti-Fornero reform implemented new regulations aimed at better 
systematisation,
43
 in order to comply with the ‘fragmented unemployment benefit 
system’ as described in the above mentioned 2011 Council Recommendations,
44
 to 
which the 2012 NAP referred. The reform did not, however, solve the problem of the 
absence of protection assistance for every person, and therefore at national level, Italy 
provides only insurance benefits in the case of unemployment.  
The Monti-Fornero reform did partially increase the level of protection offered to 
precarious workers through the introduction of two specific benefits
45
 but, at the same 
time, it progressively transformed another unemployment benefit, the indennitá di 
mobilitá, by tightening eligibility requirements. This benefit has traditionally been more 
protective, in terms of duration, level of economic assistance, and activation 
opportunities, than that of other categories. The reform also introduced a new system to 
provide new public short-time working schemes in fields where they were lacking.
46
 
With regard to activation policies, the reform included several dispositions aiming to 
improve the management of employment policies, but no significant outcomes seem to 
have been achieved. The attempt to introduce the mentioned new dispositions was 
coherent with the Council Recommendation on the Italian 2011 NRP, which asked for 
better political governance, not only limited to the LM, to address the discrepancies 
amongst the regions.  
Duties on behalf of the State were also established: a specific and minimum level of 
service must be offered to unemployed people, in adherence to the Constitution (Art. 




a) The punitive approach of the Monti-Fornero reform 
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With regard to activation duties, the Monti-Fornero reform strengthened the disciplinary 
aspects related to the conditionality of unemployment benefits. This aspect seems to be 
more connected to the 2011 NRP of the Berlusconi government than to the 2012 NRP 
of Monti:  the 2011 NRP stressed the need for more conditionality between benefits and 
training activities or employment offers, ‘in accordance with the active approach 
recommended by the European Union’.  In line with this tendency, the reform modified 
the concept of suitable job offer, i.e. a job offer from the PES, which cannot be refused 
by the unemployed person. This definition reduced the level of protection for the 
unemployed person in terms of consideration of their professional profile. Now a 
‘suitable job’ is a job, for which the salary is up to 20% lower than the last benefit 
amount allocated to the unemployed person.  No minimum amount is stated for either 
the wage or the benefit. Therefore, there is no consideration for the capacities and skills 
or previous job of the workers. 
 
3.2.2. The Renzi Job Acts project, 2015 
 
The 2012-2013 Council Recommendations
48
 on Italy’s annual NRP highlighted crucial 
issues, which affects the LM, and fixed new goals such as an improvement in the 
efficiency of public administration, a correct managing of the EU fund in the South of 
Italy, a better management of banks, the fight against tax evasion, an effective 
implementation of LM reforms, in the light of an increasing awareness of the 
discrepancy between regulation and its effective implementations and outcomes.  
In 2014 the public administration efficiency issue was pointed out also in connection 
with the need for: more transparency; stricter monitoring and controlling procedures, 
especially in the South; and the implementation of measures against corruption.
49
 
In 2015 the Renzi government introduced new changes in passive and active LMPs,
50
 
which should be considered within a wider picture, i.e. the ‘Job Acts project’. The idea 
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is still the need to achieve flexicurity, by downsizing the protection in case of dismissal 
and by increasing the employer’s powers in the working relationship. For this reason the 
government widely liberalised the usage of the fixed-term contract
51
 and introduced the 
contratto unico a tutele crescenti – a new form of employment contract - in order to 
deal with the segmentation of the LM. But this contract involved a downsizing of the 
protection in case of dismissal in comparison with the traditional employment contract. 
Lowering the protection for the ‘insider’ does not seem a way to cope with the 
segmentation of the LM in a country in which a strong welfare system is lacking. 
The idea of the Job Act was also oriented towards strengthening social protection in 
case of unemployment and increasing the effectiveness of activation policies. 
 
a) The attempts of the Renzi reform to strengthen social protect and activation 
 
Particularly from 2013 the Council recommended to Italy to improve the PES’ 
efficiency.  
The 2015 Council recommendation
52
 addressed to Italy insisted on an improvement of 
active LMPs and fight against youth unemployment. Notwithstanding the 
implementation of the Youth Guarantee, which had a different impact from region to 
region, the youth unemployment rate remains high, i.e. 40.3% in 2015.
53
  
The Legislative Decrees, which have been adopted to implement the Renzi Job Acts, 
introduced relevant changes in both in active and passive LMPs. 
With regard to unemployment benefits, a new and unique benefit, the Naspi - which is 
around 75% of the wage, with a maximum ceiling of EUR 1300, and can be allocated 
for a maximum of 2 years - means literally ‘new social insurance for employment’ 
(Nuova Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego). The Naspi is more accessible than 
previous benefits for precarious workers because eligibility requirements are 13 weeks 
of contributions within the previous 4 years together with at least 30 working days 
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within the 12 months before the beginning of the unemployment. Before the Naspi, the 
requirement to access the more common unemployment benefit was one worked year in 
the last two years.  
Nevertheless, the reform does not introduce assistance at national level for the 
unemployed. In this way, Italy fails to comply with Art. 38 of the Constitution, stating 
that every citizen who is not able to work and who does not have sufficient resources to 
live, has the right to social assistance. The same article states also that workers have the 
right to be provided by the State with means which enable them to cope with living 
needs in case of accident, sickness, disability and old age, and involuntary 
unemployment. In this field, the Renzi reform reached just some achievements in 
creating an unemployment allowance, the assegno di disoccupazione, i.e. financed by 
the general taxation, but still linked to the unemployed person´s contributory, until 
financial resources are available.
54
  
The Renzi reform also introduced a new activation tool, the assegno di ricollocazione, 
which allows accessing to employment services and initiatives, even provided by 
private actors, after 4 months from the PES registration.
55
  
This measure seems to be coherent with the specific Council recommendation made to 
Italy at the end of the 2013 European Semester, by the EU Council, with what concern 
the LM, in particular in order to strengthen vocational education and training. 
But once again, a regulation - which potentially could improve the ALMPs in Italy - 
meets implementation problems due to a lack of resources, and to other factors such as 
the traditional inefficiency of PES.  
According to the reform, the unemployed person and the public employment office have 
to sign an agreement (patto di servizio), which is now compulsory and which implies 
the obligation to be immediately available to work and to comply with specific 
activation duties.  
The person, who does not accept a job offer, which is considered suitable by law, can 
lose her/his benefit or see it reduced. The Renzi reform states new sanctions in case of 
non-fulfilment of the activation duties. The innovation is that for the first time a 
graduation of sanctions is introduced.  
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b) LMP organisation: the new Agency 
 
The Renzi reform introduced a new Agency, the National Agency for Activation 
policies (Agenzia Nazionale per le Politiche Attive del Lavoro), which should 
coordinate the active LMPs in the country and, in specific, a services network for 
employment policies to ensure more efficient public employment services, according to 
the 2013 Council-specific Recommendations. 
This Agency needs to coordinate itself with other actors of the LM. In Italy 
unemployment benefits are paid by the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) and 
employment services are provided at the territorial level through the PES at the 
territorial level, the Centri per l´Impiego, together with private actors with specific 
accreditation.  
The role of private providers has already been launched particularly by the reform on 
the LM of 2003,
56
 with a role to compete with and complete the PES activity, according 
to a NPM approach. But not significant positive outcomes followed their introduction.
57
  
Efforts in improving databases are evident in the reforms of recent years, and brought 
some achievements, especially as regards the INPS’s efficiency. 
 
3.2.3. Focus on the country’s system problems, 2015-2016 
 
As described, improvements in active LMP were introduced by the Renzi reform. At the 
same time, Italy has been experiencing a delay in this field for at least twenty years and 
the current outcomes are still widely inadequate to cope with the need for efficient 
active LMPs.  
Macroeconomic policies aiming to create jobs through investment are needed in the 
Member States, as mentioned in the 2015 EUEG.
58
 Incentives to hire new workers and a 
mere regulation of the functioning of LM – which were introduced by this government - 
seem to be largely insufficient in Italy to bring an effective positive result in copying 
with unemployment.  
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The 2016 Council Recommendation, addressed to Italy, highlights the need to 
implement the new regulation in active LMPs introduced by the Renzi reform, in 
particular concerning the efficiency of PES, the measures against poverty and the 
rationalisation of social expenditure, to activate persons out of the market together with 
the possible introduction of a basic income.  
At the same time, one of the Recommendations addressed to Italy in 2016 focused on 








From the reunification in 1990 Germany had to cope with the challenge of harmonising 
the considerable differences between the East and West German LMs, and of dealing 




Activation measures were re-launched in 1997, when the Arbeitsförderungsgesetz was 
included into the Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch III – SGB III). Arbeitsförderung means 
‘employment promotion’ – a concept that we can also define as ‘activation.
60
 
The 1997 reform introduced new activation measures and the ‘integration contract’. The 
latter was an agreement signed - voluntarily - between the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, (the 
PES), and the unemployed, and used as a tool for more efficient tailor-made initiatives. 
According to the first EU employment strategy pillar, i.e. ‘improving employability’, 
the 1998 German NAP considered the 1997 reform as a way to focus on employment 
promotion tools both to prevent long-term unemployment and to reintegrate jobless 
persons as soon as possible into the LM. Moreover, the 1997 reform enlarged the 
definition of ‘suitable job’ by including all the jobs corresponding to the abilities of the 
worker, but with a digressive salary threshold in comparison with the previous 
employment.  
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In the case of unemployment assistance, there is no a definition of ‘suitable job’, but the 
Courts usually consider suitable any jobs,
61
 according to a principle of ‘unlimited 
acceptability of work’.
 62
 It would be possible also to take into consideration how this 
principle is coherent with the constitutional right to freely choose an occupation. 
Personal or general reasons can be considered a justification to refuse the job. 
 
4.2. GERMAN REFORMS IN LMPS AND THE EUEG 
 
The 1998 memorandum ‘Der Weg nach vorn für Europas Sozialdemokraten’ / ‘Europe: 
The Third Way’ / ‘Die Neue Mitte’ contained the core of the current ALMP in 
Germany. This document designed a new relationship between the person and the State, 
according to which rights should not overcome responsibilities and each person should 
be responsible for themselves and their family; at the same time, the State should not be 
just a provider of benefits, but, on the contrary, should contribute to placing jobseekers 
in jobs. This ‘Third Way’ was intended to be an alternative to the neo-liberalism, trying 
to re-orient capitalism towards social issues.
63
 
The 1998 NAP focused on the concept that, in order to achieve the first EUEG pillar,
64
 
aiming at improving employability, active measures were seen as a way to keep the 
workers in employment and prevent the claiming of passive benefits (unemployment 
benefits/assistance). In the 2000 NAP great importance was placed on intensive 
counselling and placement interviews together with target group-oriented preventive 
assistance in activation. Long-term unemployment remained one of the main challenges 
for the ALMP in Germany. 
Referring to the specific Recommendation addressed to Germany for 2000, asking for ‘a 
coherent strategy to fully utilise the employment potential in the service sector’, the 
federal government stressed, in the NAP, the relevance of contributing to the 
privatisation of public services and the improvement of training systems.  
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Concerning, specifically, the guidelines on a revision of the tax and social service 
system, the EU has often encouraged a diminution of social contributions in Germany 





 took into consideration the 2000 Lisbon European Council, without 
changing the basic four pillars structure, and focusing on some specific challenges, 
including the transition to a knowledge-based economy and the modernisation of the 
European social model by investing in people and combating social exclusion. 
The 2001 NAP announced the ‘Action plan’ (Job-Aqtiv), which would be adopted in 
late 2001 and entered into force at the beginning of 2002. This Plan focused on 
activation measures, which were based on the EES; in this way their adoption could be 
legitimated in the eyes of the sceptics to the new legislation.
67
 In the plan, long-term 
unemployment was still highlighted as a crucial issue.  
 
4.2.1. The Hartz reforms 
 
The anticipated economic recovery did not materialise and a ‘modest reform’ in 
activation was introduced in 2001. Two months later, in early 2002, a ‘placement 
scandal’ revealed how the data of the PES had been manipulated, showing false 
improvements in the unemployment rate. Thus, the so-called Hartz Commission - 
named after its head - was appointed by the government to reform the PES to achieve 
‘Modern Labour Market Services’ within the NPM approach.
68
  
The Recommendations addressed to Germany in 2002 confirmed the need to tackle 
unemployment, particularly with regard to long-term unemployment – taking into 
account the specific problems of East Germany – and to women, to ethnic minorities 
and migrant workers, and to the older unemployed. The role of activation was 
highlighted together with the need to achieve more flexibilisation in working contracts. 
With regard to the need for the activation path, the 2002 German NAP mentioned the 
‘reintegration agreement’ as a key tool ‘in line with the government’s policy of Fördern 
und Fordern’ in order to encourage and motivate people to look for work. With the 
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Hartz reform this agreement became compulsory, according to the NPM approach and 
the contractualisation of social rights, widely supported by the Hartz commission. 
The government implemented the reforms suggested by the Hartz Commission, aiming 
to modify not only activation measures for the unemployed (Hartz I–III, 2003– 04) but 
also the systems of unemployment benefits and social assistance (Hartz IV, 2005–06)
69
 
as a whole.  
There are some connections between the Hartz Report and the EES. The Report 
expressly mentioned the EES even though the EES was not named in the Hartz 
reforms.
70
 At the same time, the EU openly supported the Hartz project according to the 
Country-specific Recommendations to which the 2002, 2004 and 2006 NAPs referred.  
Nevertheless, it is not possible to say which have been the mutual influences between 
the domestic and the EU level.
71
 Watt believes that the Hartz proposals reflected the 
EES as weak.
72
 At the same time, some aspects included in the EUEG, especially those 
regarding increasing activation and ‘modernising’ social security systems, were 
introduced by the Hartz reforms.  
 
a) New conceptual way to look at the unemployment benefits 
 
The Hartz reform introduced a new ‘conceptual basis’ for benefits and new guideline 
concepts in social policy, together with new expressions, such as, e.g. ‘activating 
welfare state’, ‘empowerment’, and ‘enabling’.
73
  
Thus, by claiming self-responsibility while providing an unemployment support, the 
‘carrot and stick’ logic was introduced, replacing the previous social benefits system, 
which was based on a unilateral granting of benefits. The new system conditioned both 
the eligibility requirements to access benefits and the consequences of the benefits, 
modifying profoundly ‘legal architecture’ of welfare.
 74
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The precondition to accessing the benefit was linked to the goal of finding a job 
placement (§ 25 Abs. 1 BSHG).  
All the interventions are meant to be a tool towards education and self-independence. 
As a matter of fact, in the SGB II (§ 1 Abs. 1 S. 1) it is written as ‘Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe’, 
i.e. help towards self-independence. According to Bieback this idea is used to stress that 
beneficiaries must comply with duties to keep enjoying the benefit, such as accepting 
any jobs. In his opinion this is the ‘radical idea’ of the current labour law ethic in social 




b) The Hartz IV 
 
The Hartz IV reform changed the structure of the benefits and their administration. 
In particular, unemployment assistance and social assistance were merged into a unique 
benefit, the Unemployment Benefit II, better known as Hartz IV, and regulated by the 
SGB II. This benefit brought a slight improvement in comparison with the previous 
social assistance (Sozialhilfe), but it weakened protection with regard to the previous 
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe). The Arbeitslosenhilfe was a benefit paid 
through general taxation but awarded only to people, who already accessed insurance 
unemployment benefits.  
Thus, now all the unemployed who no longer qualify for the unemployment insurance 
benefit, can access Hartz IV if they are in need (means-tested benefit) and if they are 
willing to work. The Unemployment Benefit II (Arbeitslosengeld II) is a flat-rate ‘basic 
income support for jobseekers’ and can be provided together with other benefits 
recognised for children and for housing costs.
76
 The Unemployment Benefit II is 
financed by taxes paid at the federal and municipality levels. 
The Arbeitslosengeld I, i.e. the insurance benefit, remains basically the same, and 
amounts to a percentage of the last former net income (60% or 67%) for a maximum of 
12 months, and longer for older workers. But the Hartz reform shortened the duration of 
the insurance unemployment benefits for older workers from 32 to 18 months, which in 
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2008 was re-extended to 24 months.
77
 To access the Arbeitslosengeld I one should be 
unemployed (i.e. working less than 18 hours per week),
78
 have worked 12 months 
within the last 2 years
79
 and be available to work and participate in activation initiatives 
is requested, even if less harsh than those requested for the Hartz IV. 
 
c) Hartz reforms and the new organisation of the LM  
 
Although the reform aimed at the creation of Job Centres, as a ‘one-stop shop’ service 
for the insured and uninsured unemployed,
80
 this goal was not achieved and the 
fragmentation of the German system did not improve.  
With regard to the insurance unemployment benefits, the Federal Employment Office 
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) operates as the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit). At the local level its offices become Agencies for Work (Agentur für 




Concerning the Hartz IV, or Unemployment Benefit II, joint bodies were created 
between local Agenturen für Arbeit and the municipalities. These consortia are 
characterised by a division of functions, in which the local Agentur für Arbeit finance 
and implement the activation measures and administrate the benefits for persons willing 
to work, whereas municipalities administrate the rent subsidies and the social services 
like childcare facilities, social-psychological counselling, etc. This complex 
organisation is integrated with Optionskommunen, i.e. opted-out communes or 
municipalities with sole responsibility, which are municipalities fully responsible for 




d) New Public Management: The Hartz approach 
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According to the NPM, the accountability outcomes of local employment agencies has 
started to be considered crucial, such as the outsourcing of a number of employment 
services and the competition between private providers. Public-private partnership of all 
stakeholders, including of private employment agencies, should play a pivotal role in 
the effectiveness of active LMPs. 
But as regards private providers, researchers have showed that marketisation has not 
been really effective.
83
 Furthermore, this shared responsibility with private actors could 
also be ambiguous in influencing, controlling and cooperating.
84
 The reforms of recent 
years introduced a competitive contracting-out in training from 2005, in ‘activation 
measures’ from 2012, and in placements from 2002.
85
 Furthermore, at the beginning of 
2000 a voucher system was introduced, leaving beneficiaries free to choose the 
activation services (placement, training and ‘activation and placement’) providers from 




e) The discretional procedure in the LM in Hartz active LMPs 
 
In determining and planning the activation initiatives, an excessive discretion is left to 
the civil servant of the Arbeitsagentur or of the Jobcentre as regards deciding which 
measures can be proposed to the unemployed. Should the beneficiary not agree with this 
decision, they rarely refuse it due to the difficulties involved in taking legal action 
against it. One of the main problems is that beneficiaries usually do not receive enough 




f) Role of social partners in Hartz times 
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The role of the social partners was weakened in 2001 with the abolition of the 
corporatist boards of directors at all three levels of the Federal Employment Office; the 




Moreover, the introduction of the Hartz IV benefit indirectly downsized the social 
partners’ role because municipalities are not legally obliged to create structures/bodies 
with social partners’ participation. Often, they promote advisory bodies including social 
partners together with other associations.
89
  
The weakening of the social partners’ role, such as already mentioned for Denmark and 
Italy, is not coherent with the EU indications to promote the social partners’ 
participation in implementing the EUEG. 
 
4.2.2. Final recommendations 
 
With regard to the LM, the 2015 Council Recommendation addressed to Germany 
highlights the need to incentivise later retirement, reduce taxes and social contributions 
and provide a revision of mini-jobs (with monthly earning of EUR 450) in order to 
favour the transition to other forms of works. Public investments are encouraged in 
infrastructure, education and research; in particular, the German public spending on 
education as a proportion of GDP is still below the EU average.
90
 The 2016 Country 
Recommendation points in the same direction, highlighting that attempts to date are still 
not sufficient and pointing out the need, from an active LM perspective, to foster the 





5. CONCLUSION (AND MANY QUESTIONS)  
 
Even if it has not been possible to analyse in detail the regulation of unemployment 
benefits and corresponding activation duties in the three Member States considered 
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 some conclusions can be proposed and, meanwhile, many questions for possible 
further analyses can be posed. 
There is, in all three of the systems under analysis, a common tendency towards the 
implementation of NPM ideas, which started as early as the late 1990s/early 2000s, and 
which continue up to the present day. 
NPM has been reflected in the three systems by an increasing ‘work-first’ approach, a 
tightening in conditionality between activation duties and unemployment benefits, and 
the progressive adoption of a contractualisation perspective towards benefits, insurance 
benefits and assistance; in substance, towards a quid pro quo between benefits and 
activation duties. Moreover, the marketisation of employment services, together with 
market-based tools and IT systems to measure performance, have become an integral 
part of the systems considered, but both the involvement of private actors and the way 
in which the measuring tools are used, have been criticised by part of the literature 
(supra). 
The contractualisation of benefits has an impact on the principles, in the three systems, 
on which unemployment benefits, and therefore their social security systems, have been 
based.  
One question which might be posed, is whether the systems can legitimately transform a 
right, i.e. the right to unemployment benefit, into a quid pro quo for activation duties; 
activation duties were part of the systems of the three Member States even before the 
implementation of the reforms presented here, but this does not imply that they should 
be considered as prerequisites for access to unemployment benefits. We might wonder 
if this is the way to realise that transition from passive to active measures which has 
been promoted by the EU up to now, in line with the concept of flexicurity, on which 
the EU builds its guidelines and strategies, and which promotes the achievement of 
effective and activating LMPs by the Member States. 
Some attempts have undoubtedly been made in this direction. In all the Member States 
activation themes have become a crucial element of LMP, but what this means in real 
terms is difficult to ascertain. Denmark has downsized both its active and passive LMP 
measures, Germany was unable to manage its fragmented system, while Italy, despite 
relevant attempts, seems still far from practising what we understand as an effective 
active LMP.  Furthermore, the perspective which was adopted by the different reforms 
focused more on the individual responsibilities of unemployed people than on finding 
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effective ways to help activate them. The highly discretional German system leaves few 
possibilities for the unemployed to control the activation process, and even in Denmark 
the traditional tailor-made initiatives were downsized, whereas in Italy the 
implementation of proposed new activation tools is doubtful because of lack of 
resources and issues over efficiency. 
The ‘work-first’ approach, on which the three systems seem to be oriented through the 
tightening of the suitable job offers, focuses on finding a job - any job - as quickly as 
possible. In Denmark, municipalities receive funds from the central governments which 
depend on their success and speed in placing people in jobs, with no consideration for 
the quality, length, prospects etc. of the employment opportunity. In all the Member 
States under analysis, placing an unemployed person in employment limits social 
expenditure. But which kind of jobs? This issue seems to impact the right to work in 
Italy, the (public) obligation to make efforts to guarantee work for every able-bodied 
citizen in Denmark, and the right to freely choose an occupation in German. 
From the same, qualitative
93
 perspective, the 2015 and 2016 specific Recommendations 
for Germany raise the issue of mini-jobs; criticism has also been voiced in Denmark; in 
Italy ‘flexibilisation’ increased whilst levels of social protection were reduced. Fixed-
term and precarious jobs however can also have an impact, in the long term, on the 
social security system, because they mean lower social insurance contributions, crucial 
for insurance benefits, and may mean an increase in the cost of social assistance. From 
the perspective of individual responsibility adopted by the NPM approach which 
focuses on will/choice for the unemployed person, what is the responsibility of the 
worker, who is hired for a limited period of time, which is not long enough to permit 
future access to stronger contribution-based protection? 
The shift in Germany towards the Hartz IV system, raises also relevant issues about the 
progressive abandonment of stronger protection, which was linked to the previous 
wage. This also concerns Denmark, where a decrease in the duration of unemployment 
benefit provision has meant reduced protection for unemployed persons. 
The work-first approach towards any job seems to contradict the Lisbon 2000 idea of 
becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion, or of achieving the goal of the Flagship Initiative: ‘An Agenda for new skills 
and jobs’ in accordance with Europe 2020.   
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It is crucial, therefore, to understand how much the EU and the Member States really 
believe in the potential of active LMPs. The human capital approach of the Danish 
system would seem the more coherent one to achieve ‘inclusive growth’ (Europe 2020), 
but this system is also progressively changing towards a work-first approach.  
Also in the picture is another common aspect of the domestic reforms: the progressive 
downsizing of the role of the social partners in LMPs, in contradiction with the EUEG, 
which calls for their active involvement in the field.  
As already said at the beginning of this article it is not possible, within the limited scope 
of the present analysis, to evaluate in detail how effectively the systems of the Member 
States’ systems have been influenced by EUEG in the field under study.  As previously 
mentioned, reforms often referred to the EUEG, and some of their concepts have 
effectively been introduced as key goals in the domestic systems, but at the same time, 
it is also possible that the reforms do not reflect EUEG, or are limited to some aspects 
of them. This is the main problem of the soft-law nature of the EUEGs, which are not 
legally, but only politically, binding. Even if the EUEGs were legally binding however, 
something else must be mentioned here, although not analysed in this contribution, 
given limitations of space. As is evident, the LMP tendencies highlighted here, with 
regards NPM, started, in all three Member States, at the end of the 1990s/early 2000s, 
and correspond to the neo-liberalist approach taken to labour law throughout the whole 
of the EU. These tendencies developed gradually and were accelerated by the economic 
crisis and without reflecting contingent needs, rather than as part of a long-term unique 
strategy. This approach is based on a particular way of looking at LMP, based on 
unforeseeable market needs and requiring as much flexibility as possible, within the 
idea of a light State. This perspective would be able to condition the domestic 
implementation of general concepts and ideas promoted in the EUEG, and therefore a 
crucial issue should be to take into consideration the best perspective to adopt in order 
to interpret these concepts and ideas in coherence with EU employment goals. 
 
